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COMMENTS 
Convertible Securities and Section 16 (b) : The Persistent 
Problems of Purchase, _Sale, and Debts Previously Con• 
tracted 
In 1934, Congress enacted section 16(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act1 in an effort to counteract the evils flowing from specu-
lation in corporate securities by certain persons having information 
regarding the corporation's affairs or occupying positions of trust 
which permit manipulation of corporate policies.2 In general, sec-
tion 16(b) permits the issuer, or one or more stockholders acting in 
its behalf, to recover any "short-swing" profit realized from pur-
chases and sales (or sales and purchases) of the issuer's equity securi-
ties within a six-month period by directors,8 officers,4 or beneficial 
owners of more than ten per cent of any class of equity securities.is 
Once these statutory conditions ar~ satisfied, it is irrelevant that the 
insider did not actually make use of privileged information° or, in-
deed, that he sold his stock for the corporation's benefit and at its 
request.7 
The incidence of section 16(b), however, is also highly restricted, 
and it does not strip the corporate insider of all of his natural ad-
vantages. For instance, recovery is limited to transactions completed 
within a six-month span. Thus, an insider utilizing privileged in• 
formation may with impunity dispose of his securities one day after 
1. 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964). 
2. The abuses which § 16(b) was designed to prevent were disclosed by an extcn• 
sive investigation into stock exchange practices conducted by the Senate Committee 
on Banking and Currency. Sec Hearings on S. Res. 84 and S. Res. 56 if 97 Before the 
Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st &: 2d Sess. pt. 15 (1934). 
For a thorough discussion of the practices leading up to the enactment of § 16(b), 
see Cook &: Feldman, Insider Trading Under the Securities Exchange Act (pt. I), 66 
HARV. L. REV. 385 (1953); Rubin &: Feldman, Statutory Inhibitions Upon Unfair Use 
of Corporate Information by Insiders, 95 U. PA. L. REv. 468 (1947); Yourd, Trading 
in Securities by Directors, Officers and Stockholders: Section 16 of the Securities Ex-
change Act, 38 MICH. L. REv. 133 (1939). 
3. "The term 'director' means any director of a corporation or any person perform• 
ing similar functions with respect to any organization, whether incorporated or unin-
corporated." 48 Stat. 883 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(7) (1964). 
4. "The term 'officer' means a president, vice-president, treasurer, secretary, comp• 
troller, and any other person who performs for an issuer, whether incorporated or ·un-
incorporated, functions corresponding to those performed by the foregoing officers." 
SEC Reg. X-3B-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-2 (1964). Although the definition seems to be ex-
plicit, there is substantial disagreement among the authorities. See 2 Loss, SECURITIES 
REGULATION 1081-94 (2d ed. 1961). 
5. See generally 2 Loss, op. cit. supra note 4, at 1100-08. 
6. See Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 235-36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 820 
U.S. 751 (1943); text accompanying notes 84 and 85 infra. 
7. See Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965); Magida v. Continental 
Can Co., 231 F.2d 843 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 972 (1956). 
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the expiration of the statutory period.8 Furthermore, there is no 
attempt to cover situations where the insider "advises" his friends9 
or exchanges tips with insiders in other companies,10 and the statute 
does not actually prohibit the use of inside information in short-
swing transactions; it simply takes -the profit out of such activity.11 
Finally, the act contains an express exception which provides that 
an insider is not liable for profits from short-swing transactions in 
securities if the securities were "acquired in good faith in connec-
tion with a debt previously contracted."12 In general, however, the 
courts have construed section 16(b) very liberally, permitting recov-
ery on the basis of somewhat nebulous, and even inconsistent, the-
ories.18 The result has been that whenever an insider purchases and 
sells the same or closely related equity securities within a six-month 
period, liability for realized profits is almost automatic.14 
The principal difficulty in applying section 16(b) is that of deter-
mining what Congress intended by the use of the terms "purchase" 
and "sale." The statutory definitions are extremely sketchy, provid-
ing only that the term "purchase" includes "any contract to buy, 
8. B. T. Babbitt, Inc. v. Lachner, 332 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1964). 
9. Earlier drafts of the insider-trading provision had much broader coverage than 
the language which now appears in § 16(b). Section 15(b) of both S. 2693 and H.R. 
7852, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), provided: "It shall be unlawful for any director, 
officer, or [beneficial owner of five per cent of any class of stock] .•• (3) To disclose, 
directly or indirectly, any confidential information regarding or affecting any such 
registered security •••• Any profit made by any person, to whom such unlawful dis-
closure shall have been made, in respect of any transaction • • • within a period not 
exceeding 6 months after such disclosure shall inure to and be recoverable by the 
issuer unless such person shall have had no reasonable ground to believe that the 
disclosure was confidential •••• " This sweeping forfeiture provision was apparently 
omitted from the final act because of anticipated problems of administration. See 
Rattner v. Lehman, 193 F.2d 564, 566 (2d Cir. 1952); Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 
F.2d 231, 236 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943). 
10. Cf. Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403, 414-23 (1962) (dissenting opinion). See Cole, 
Insiders' Liabilities Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 12 Sw. L.J. 147, 150 
n.22 (1958); Comment, 50 CALIF. L. REv. 500 (1962); Note, 14 STAN. L. REv. 192, 199 
(1961). 
11. Denial of profit to insiders is imposed as an administrative sanction and not 
upon any theory that such profits belong to the corporation by reason of a property 
right. See Brudney, Insider Securities Dealings During Corporate Crises, 61 MICH. L. 
R.Ev. I, 7 (1962). Moreover, § 16(b) is considered to be prophylactic rather than penal. 
See .Booth v. Varian Associates, 334 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 
(1965); Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840, 844 (2d Cir. 1959). But see Painter, The Evolv-
ing Role of Section 16(b), 62 MICH. L. R.Ev. 649, 650 (196.4), where the author points 
out that since recoveries are maximized wherever possible, the statute has acquired 
quasi-penal overtones. 
12. 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964). 
13. See .Booth v. Varian Associates, 334 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 
U.S. 961 (1965); Halleran &: Calderwood, Effect of Federal Regulation on Distribution 
of and Trading in Securities, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 86, 114 (1959); Painter, supra 
note 11, at 650. 
14. See Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 
751 (1943); 2 Loss, op. cit. supra note 4, at 1043; Comment, 59 YALE L.J. 510, 513 
(1950); Note, 107 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 719, 721 (1959). 
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purchase, or otherwise acquire"15 and that the term "sale" includes 
"any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of" a security.10 Since 
many types of transactions are ne_ither clearly within nor clearly 
without the contemplation of this vague statutory language, section 
16(b) is regarded as one of the most ambiguous provisions of all the 
New Deal securities legislation.17 
There has been considerable litigation concerning the proper 
construction of these terms in various types of specialized securities 
transactions. The principal areas of confusion have developed in 
connection with receipt and exercise of warrants to purchase stock,18 
exercise of stock options granted in consideration of an insider's 
services, 19 exchange of stock pursuant to a corporate reorganization 
or simplification,20 and, most significantly, conversion of preferred 
stock or debentures into the issuer's common stock.21 Due primarily 
to the large number of recent cases involving convertible securities, 
the following effort to delineate the scope of section l 6(b) will be 
undertaken in the context of conversion transactions. However, 
all of the foregoing transactions are closely related, and thus it 
would appear that the general principles underlying the broad con-
cepts of "purchase" and "sale" should apply uniformly in all of 
these situations.22 
15. 48 Stat. 882 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(l3) (1964). 
16. 48 Stat. 882 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(l4) (1964). 
17. See Halleran & Caldenvood, supra note 13, at 114. 
18. See Shaw v. Dreyfuss, 172 F.2d 140 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 907 (1949); 
Truncale v. Blumberg, 88 F. Supp. 677 (S.D.N.Y.), afj'd per curiam sub nom. Truncalc 
v. Scully, 182 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir. 1950); Truncale v. Blumberg, 80 F. Supp. 887 
(S.D.N.Y. 1948). 
19. See Kornfeld v. Eaton, 327 F.2d 263 {2d Cir. 1964); Greene v. Dietz, 247 F.2d 
689 (2d Cir. 1957); Blau v. Ogsbury, 210 F.2d 426 {2d Cir. 1954); Walct v. Jefferson 
Lake Sulphur Co., 202 F.2d 433 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 820 (1953); Perlman v. 
Timberlake, 172 F. Supp. 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Steinberg v. Sharpe, 95 F. Supp. 32 
(S.D.N.Y. 1950), afj'd per curiam, 190 F.2d 82 {2d Cir. 1951). See generally Halleran, 
The Impact of Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19!)1 on Restricted 
Stock Options, 15 Bus. LAw. 158 (1959). 
20. See Booth v. Varian Associates, 334 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 
961 (1965); Roberts v. Eaton, 212 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 827 (1954): 
Blau v. Mission Corp., 212 F.2d 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1016 (1954); Blau v. 
Hodgkinson, 100 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). 
21. See Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965); B. T. Babbitt, Inc. v. 
Lachner, 332 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1964); Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 
1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959); Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 
984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947); Blau v. Lamb, 242 F. Supp. 151 (S.D.N,Y. 
1965); Blau v. Lamb, 163 F. Supp. 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). Cf. Blau v. Max Factor &: Co., 
342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 86 Sup. Ct. 180 (1965). 
22. Cf. Roberts v. Eaton, 212 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 827 (1954); 
Blau v. Ogsbury, 210 F.2d 426, 427 (2d Cir. 1954). As originally enacted, § 16(b) 
applied only to securities which were registered on a national securities exchange. 
However, the scope of the statute has been enlarged recently by the Securities Acts 
Amendments of 1964 to encompass a large number of issuers whose securities arc 
traded over the counter. 78 Stat. 565, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1964). See Little, Practical 
Implications of the Recent Federal Securities Legislation for the Over-the-Counter 
Company, 10 PRAC. LAW. No. 7, at 43 (1964). 
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I. THE ELUSIVE MEANING OF "PURCHASE" AND "SALE" 
Corporate securities which may be exchanged, at the owner's 
option, for a different class of securities ·of the same or an affiliated 
corporation are considered to be convertible.23 Generally, convert-
ible issues are reasonably secure investments, such as bonds or pre-
ferred stock, which provide a fixed return on capital.24 In contrast, 
the underlying or "conversion" security is frequently common 
stock, which is more speculative but offers a possibility for greater 
future income and market appreciation. It is evident that, from the 
standpoint of the investor, the attraction of a convertible issue is 
based upon its combination of these two distinct factors-current 
income and potential growth in value. The income feature, which 
inheres in a convertible security by reason of its being a direct obli-
gation of the issuer,25 is independent of the conversion privilege. 
On the other hand, the opportunity for capital appreciation is a 
concomitant of the right to convert to the underlying common 
stock. With respect to the issuer, the presence in a convertible secu-
rity of the two elements of income and capital appreciation enables 
it to obtain a greater market price for an issue than otherwise 
would be possible without the conversion feature.26 Thus, converti-
ble securities are in effect a device which permits the issuer to ac-
quire present capital in return for the purchaser's right to partici-
pate in future profits. 
A. Early Developments .and Overly Broad Statements of the Law 
The application of section 16(b) to cases involving convertible 
securities is made difficult by the fact that an insider who acquires 
such a holding also has a real interest in the underlying stock.27 
If, for example, the market price of the underlying stock rises above 
the conversion price, the value of the convertible security increases 
proportionately. Conversely, if the market price of the underlying 
stock declines, the price of the convertible security is correspond-
ingly reduced until it reaches a level where it is supported. by its 
inherent qualities as a bond or preferred stock.28 Indeed, as long 
23. See generally 1 DEWING, FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 256 (5th ed. 1953); 
Hills, Convertible Securities-Legal Aspects and Draftsmanship, 19 CALIF. L. REY. 1 
(1930). 
24. 1 DEWING, op. cit. supra note 23, at 256-58. 
25. Id. at 269. 
26. Id. at 268. 
27. See Falco v. Donner Foundation, Inc., 208 F.2d 600, 603 (2d Cir. 1953), where 
the court stated in dictum: "for all practical purposes a convertible bond is equivalent 
to the number of shares of stock into which it is convertible." See generally Cook & 
Feldman, supra note 2, at 624; Note, 72 HAR.v. L. REY. 1392, 1394 (1959); Note, 59 
HARV. L. 'REV. 998, 999 (1946). 
28. See generally 1 DEWING, op. cit. supra note ·23. Cf. Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 
F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959). 
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as the conversion privilege remains viable and the price of the under-
lying stock exceeds the conversion price, the value of the convertible 
security is determined by the market valuation placed upon the 
conversion security.29 Thus, in the absence of market manipulation 
or similar unconscionable activity, it would appear that an insider 
can achi~ve no greater speculative advantage by converting his 
debentures or preferred stock and selling the underlying common 
stock than by pursuing the direct course of disposing of the con-
vertible security itself. Nevertheless, the courts have expressed 
widely divergent, and somewhat irreconcilable, views on the subject 
of short-swing conversions and sales by insiders. 
The first major court of appeals decision to consider the impli-
cations of the foregoing interrelationship between convertible and 
conversion securities in the context of section 16(b) was Park b 
Tilford v. Schulte.30 The defendants owned both a majority of the 
outstanding common st~ck and 6,604 shares of convertible preferred, 
which, unlike the common, was not listed on a securities exchange. 
The preferred was redeemable on ninety days' notice at a price of 
fifty-five dollars per share, with the holder having a right to exercise 
his conversion privilege any time before the final redemption date. 
In December 1943 the corporation gave notice that the preferred 
was to be redeemed. However, from the latter part of 1943 until 
May 1944 the market price of the common underwent a spectacular 
rise because of a rumor that the issuer was about to declare a divi-
dend in kind (liquor) on its common stock. During January 1944 
the defendants exercised their conversion right, and within six 
months they sold the common stock thus acquired for prices as high 
as ninety-eight dollars per share. 
The issuing corporation instituted an action to recover the short-
swing profits. The district court allowed recovery, and its decision 
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. With-
out even discussing the possibilities for abuse of confidential infor-
mation in the context of this particular transaction, the court stated: 
We think a conversion of preferred into common stock 
followed by a sale within six months is a "purchase and sale" 
within the statutory language of § 16(b). Whatever doubt 
might otherwise exist as to whether a conversion is a "purchase" 
is dispelled by definition of "purchase" to include "any contract 
to buy, purchase, or othenvise acquire." . . . Defendants did 
not own the common stock in question before they exercised 
their option to convert; they did afterward. Therefore they 
acquired the stock, within the meaning of the Act.31 
29. Ferraiolo v. Newman, supra note 28, at 345. 
30. 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. '761 (194'7). 
31. Id. at 98'7. Although the decision is generally regarded as correct in relation 
to the particular facts before the court, the opinion bas received frequent criticism 
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This approach to the definitional problem, termed the strict or all-
inclusive view, 82 clearly indicates an intent to give the broadest pos-
sible construction to the terms "purchase" and "sale," and eliminates 
any possibility of discretionary administration of a statute which is 
designed to obviate all incentive to abuse inside information.83 
Other courts, however, confronted with different fact situations, 
soon found that the sweeping language of the opinion required 
modification.34 The inroads upon the broad generalizations found 
throughout the Park &- Tilford opinion eventually culminated in 
the Sixth Circuit decision of Ferraiolo v. Newman.35 In that case, 
the court held that the receipt of common stock of the Ashland Oil 
and Refining Company in exchange for its convertible preferred 
was not a "purchase." Park &- Tilford was distinguished on several 
grounds. First, Judge Potter Stewart pointed out that whereas the 
defendants in Park &- Tilford were in actual control of the corpo-
ration, the defendant director in Ferraiolo assumed only a passive role 
in corporate affairs. Judge Stewart concluded from this that the con-
version of the Ashland preferred had been genuinely forced by the 
board of directors, by means of a call for redemption made at a 
time when the price of the common (and consequently the preferred 
as well) substantially exceeded the call price. Second, the court em-
phasized the fact that the Ashland convertible preferred, as well as 
the common, was listed and actively traded. Third, unlike the situ-
ation in Park &- Tilford, the conversion privilege attached to the 
Ashland preferred could not be diluted36 by a stock split or stock 
dividend which would increase the number of common shares. On 
the basis of these factors, the court concluded that the effect of 
Ashland's call of the preferred was simply to force the surrender of 
the preference feature and that in reality the preferred and common 
stocks of Ashland were "economic equivalents." In explaining its 
decision, the court stated: "Newman's conversion of Ashland pre-
ferred to Ashland common had none of the economic indicia of a 
for propounding an indefensibly broad rule. Most commentators feel that the decision 
could have rested on the fact that the convertible preferred was closely held and 
essentially nonmarketable, so that the conversion to common, which was readily 
marketable, gave the defendants a real change in speculative opportunity. See 2 Loss, 
op. cit. supra note 4, at 1067; Note, 36 U. DET. L.J. 343, 346 (1959). But see Note, 59 
HARV. L. REv. 998 (1946). 
32. See Note, 49 IowA L. REv. 1346, 1350 (1964); Comment, 11 STAN. L. REv. 358, 359 
(1959). 
33. See Meeker & Cooney, The Problem of Definition in Determining Insider Lia• 
bilities Under Section 16(b), 45 VA. L. REv. 949 (1959); Comment, 11 STAN. L. REv. 
358 (1959). 
34. For a detailed account of subsequent developments, see Cole, supra note 10, at 
161. 
35. 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959). 
36. For an explanation of the term "dilution" in the context of securities transac-
tions, see. note 46 infra and accompanying text. 
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purchase; it created no opportunity for profit which had not existed 
since 1948. The transaction was not one that could have lent itself 
to the practices which Section 16(b) was enacted to prevent."87 
B. Recent Developments 
Despite the numerous distinctions between the Ashland and 
Park & Tilford preferred stock and the dissimilar circumstances of 
the exchange of those securities for the underlying common stock, 
the Ferraiolo decision was widely acclaimed as having rejected any 
application of the Park rb- Tilford doctrine beyond the specific facts 
of that case.118 While the Second Circuit has not had any opportunity 
to re-examine its prior reasoning, at least two of that court's recent 
opinions indicate that it still regards the sweeping rule in Park rb-
Tilford as an accurate statement of the law in cases involving con-
vertible securities.89 In contrast, however, the Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit recently cited Ferraiolo with approval and held 
that where an issuer's common and convertible class A stocks were 
equally marketable and both securities were traded at precisely the 
same price, a conversion would not be a "purchase" of the common 
within the meaning of section 16(b).40 
In the most recent case involving this interpretative controversy, 
Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster,41 the Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit was presented with factors similar to those relied upon by 
the defendants in both Park rb- Tilford and Ferraiolo. On November 
20, 1958, defendant Webster, a director of Heli-Coil, acquired de-
benture bonds which were convertible into the common stock of 
the plaintiff corporation at the option of the bondholder. About 
three months later, the investment banking firm that advised the 
issuer on financial matters suggested to the defendant that he convert 
37. 259 F.2d 342, 346 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959), As in the 
case of the language in Park & Tilford, this statement has also been criticized for 
being overly broad. See, e.g., Meeker &: Cooney, supra note 33; Comment, 11 STAN. L, 
REv. 358 (1959); Note, 107 u. PA. L. REV. 719 (1959). 
38. See, e.g., Note, 72 HARv. L. REv. 1392, 1394 (1959); Note, 36 U, DET. L.J. 848, 
347 (1959). 
39. In the first of these two cases, Blau v. Lehman, 286 F.2d 786 (2d Cir, 1960), 
afj'd, 368 U.S. 403 (1962), the defendant's partnership had acquired common stock, 
exchanged it for a new preferred issue pursuant to a voluntary recapitalization plan, 
and then sold the preferred-all within six months. In order to compute the amount 
of profit realized by the defendant partner, it was necessary to determine the purchase 
date. After citing Park & Tilford, Judge Medina held that the "purchase" occurred 
on the date of conversion. Id. at 792. In the second case, Judge Kaufman stated that 
"it is clear that a conversion of preferred into common is a purchase within the 
meaning of § 16(b)," but no liability resulted, because of failure to show any realiza-
tion of profit. B. T. Babbitt, Inc. v. Lachner, 332 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1964). 
40. Blau v. Max Factor &: Co., 342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 86 Sup, Ct. 180 
(1965). 
41. 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965). The district court decision is discussed in Note, 49 
IOWA L, REv. 1346 (1964), 
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his debentures, since the ·elimination of this indebtedness would 
"make a better statement." For this reason, and because he needed 
cash for personal expenses, on March 18, 1959, defendant voluntarily 
exercised his privilege to convert. Subsequently, within six months 
of the conversion date, but more than six months after acquiring 
the bonds, he sold common stock at a profit. During the entire eight-
month period in question, the market price of Heli-Coil common 
was constantly rising, a trend which continued throughout 1959. 
Although the court conceded that the common stock was the eco-
nomic equivalent of the debentures and that it was difficult to per-
ceive how Webster could have obtained an economic advantage 
from the conversion,42 it concluded that conversions should be con-
trolled by a strict "rule of thumb." It therefore held the exchange 
to be a "sale"43 of the debentures and a "purchase" of the stock. 
C. Fine Lines of Distinction 
The failure of the courts to articulate the basic rationale under-
lying their decisions in the conversion cases has left this area of the 
law in a state of confusion. This outward appearance is made more 
disturbing because of the fact that, after the Park & Tilford decision, 
there has been general agreement on the test of ·liability, as stated 
in Ferraiolo: "Every transaction which can reasonably be defined as 
a purchase will be so defined, if the transaction is of a kind which 
can possibly lend itself to the speculation encompassed by section 
16(b)."44 Thus, although the statute explicitly proscribes any in-
quiry as to whether an insider is acting upon confidential informa-
tion, it is equally clear that the foregoing test of liability requires 
an investigation into the facts of a questioned transaction to see 
whether confidential information could be utilized to the detriment 
of outside shareholders. In this respect, it appears that the Heli-Coil 
opinion has departed from the precedent established by earlier deci-
sions under section 16(b) and has also disregarded the realities of 
that particular case, since there was no showing of circumstances 
which would have made it possible for the defendant to exploit h_is 
position as an insider. In contrast, all of the earlier opinions dealing 
with short-swing conversion transactions have devoted considerable 
attention to the effect of one or more of the following factors: 
42. Id. at 164-65. 
43. Heli-Coil was the first decision to hold that a conv~rsion was a "sale" as well 
as a "purchase." Subsequently this view was adopted in Blau v. Lamb, 242 F. Supp. 
151 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). 
44. 259 F.2d at 345. Accord, Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304, 307 (9th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 86 Sup. Ct. 180 (1965); Blau v. Lehman, 286 F.2d 786, 792 (2d Cir. 1960), 
aff'd, 368 U.S. 403 (1962); Blau v. Lamb, 242 F. Supp. 151, 157 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Hell-
Coil Corp. v. Webster, 222 F. Supp. 831, 835 (D.N.J. 1963), aff'd, 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 
1965). 
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whether the convertible .issue is subject to dilution by an increase 
in the number of underlying common shares, whether the converti-
ble and conversion securities are equally marketable, and whether 
the conversion was "forced" by a corporate redemption of the con-
vertible issue. None of these three factors is conclusive with respect 
to the question of liability, but all should nevertheless be examined 
to determine whether there is any way an insider could have mis-
used privileged information. 
I. Dilution 
In the absence of any factors which would tend to create a 
greater market demand for the conversion security than for the con-
vertible security, and thereby produce a concomitant differential 
in price, it seems evident that in most situations there is no pos-
sible speculative advantage to be achieved by a conversion and sub-
sequent sale of the underlying common stock.45 Therefore, under 
Ferraiolo's "any possibility of abuse" test, it is relevant to consider 
whether the intermediate conversion itself might produce such a 
change in the economic position of the security holder that he could 
be regarded as having taken a profit on his investment. 
In this respect, it should be noted that if the convertible security 
is not protected by an anti-dilution provision, it may be possible, 
in certain circumstances, for an insider with knowledge of the cor-
poration's affairs to effect a conversion which will substantially im-
prove his economic position. Protection against dilution ensures a 
constant conversion ratio between a convertible security and the 
underlying common stock.46 If the number of outstanding common 
shares is altered, the number of common shares for which one con-
vertible security may be exchanged increases or decreases propor-
tionally. For this reason, anti-dilution provisions are commonly in-
corporated in convertible debentures and shares of convertible 
preferred stock.47 In the absence of such protection for the holders 
of convertible securities, it is obvious that inside knowledge that a 
stock split or stock dividend is imminent would present an oppor-
tunity for abuse since insiders could conver~ their holdings prior 
to the split or the date of record for the dividend, and thus partici-
pate in the increase in the number of common shares. 
Similarly, there is one additional situation in which a holder of 
a dilutable issue of convertible securities might profit, even without 
the advantage of inside information, by converting and selling the 
45. See .Blau v. Max Factor &: Co., 342 F.2d 304, 308 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 86 
Sup. Ct. 180 (1965). 
46. See Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342, 345 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 859 
U.S. 927 (1959). 
47. See, e.g., Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965); Ferraiolo v, 
Newman, supra note 46. 
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underlying common stock. If a convertible security does not contain 
an anti-dilution provision, it continually bears an overhanging 
threat that its value will be impaired by an increase in the supply 
of the conversion security. Although the effects of arbitrage48 will 
normally prevent wide differences in price unfavorable to a dilut-
able issue, rumors of an impending split or stock dividend may 
nevertheless result in temporary differentials between the market 
prices of the two types of securities. The uncertainty as to the record 
date would cause most investors to be reluctant to purchase the 
convertible issue with a view toward conversion, but persons who 
already owned the convertible securities would be in a position to 
obtain a small profit by quickly converting and selling the more 
favored common stock. 
In Ferraiolo, however, the court observed that the Ashland pre-
ferred was protected against dilution and was in that respect a mere 
substitute for the common into which it was convertible.49 This 
theory was also vigorously relied upon by the defendant in Heli-
Coil, since his convertible debentures contained a similar anti-dilu-
tion clause. Nevertheless, this indicium of the economic equivalence 
of the Heli-Coil common and debentures was completely ignored 
by the court. However, it would appear that since the He~i-Coil 
debentures were readily salable and fully protected against dilution, 
their market price would continue to be reflected accurately in the 
price of the common. Thus, since conversion of the non-dilutable 
debentures could not have produced a significant change in the eco-
nomic position of the defendant bondholder, and since conversion 
offered no greater opportunity for. profit than would a sale o~ the 
debentures themselves, the act of converting should not have been 
regarded as a "sale" of the convertible security or as a "purchase" 
of the underlying common stock. 
2. Marketability 
Many critics of the s,v-eeping statements in the Park & Tilford 
opinion have suggested that the decision is at least correct on its own 
facts, since the convertible preferred was closely held and not read-
ily marketable in the sense that it was not listed on an exchange 
or othenv-ise actively traded.50 In an active market, convertible secu-
rities and the underlying common stock are normally traded at iden-
48. The term "arbitrage" refers to a specialized form of trading which is based 
upon disparities in quoted prices of the same or practically equivalent commodities and 
securities. By virtue of one form of such trading-kind arbitrage-the price disparity 
disappears as purchases of convertible securities are offset against sales of the conver-
sion security. See Falco v. Donner Foundation, Inc., 208 F.2d 600, 603 (2d Cir. 1953); 2 
Loss, op. cit. supra note 4, at 1108 n.276. 
49. See 259 F.2d at 345. 
50. See note 31 supra. 
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tical prices;51 however, as the court in the Park & Tilford case noted, 
the private placement of large blocks of closely held convertible 
preferred stock is certain to have a depressing effect on its price.112 
Although this adverse effect could be mitigated by spreading the 
sales over a long period of time, such an approach would also in-
volve the obvious risk that the demand for, and therefore the price 
of, the underlying common might decline, thus reducing the value 
of the convertible security as well. For this reason, the insiders in 
Park & Tilford could engage in market speculation on a large scale 
only after acquiring the underlying common, which was actively 
traded on the New York Stock Exchange.63 
The ease with which widely held, actively traded securities may 
be sold in the market presents a compelling argument in favor of 
the "economic equivalency" found in Ferraiolo, where both securi-
ties were equally marketable and were traded at identical prices.114 
In such circumstances, no speculative opportunity can be gained 
by holding the common which does not also inhere in the possession 
of the convertible preferred. Conversion in this situation is not a 
liquidation of the original investment, but rather a deferment of 
accrued profits. An insider can secure the same benefit by choos-
ing not· to convert and instead selling his original (convertible) 
securities. 55 
Although the convertible debentures in Heli-Coil were unlisted, 
the court proceeded upon the basis that they were, nevertheless, 
actively traded over the counter.56 Relying on this fact and the prece-
dent of Ferraiolo, the defendant asserted that his conversion created 
no opportunity for new speculation.57 The court conceded the rele-
vance of this argument but nevertheless felt bound to follow an 
arbitrary rule of thumb that precluded all consideration of the cir-
cumstances underlying the transaction-even those which negated 
the existence of an opportunity to use inside information. However, 
since abuse of confidential information was the factor which 
prompted the enactment of section 16(b), it appears that the court's 
refusal to consider the equal marketability of the two Heli-Coil 
51. See note 29 supra and accompanying text. 
52. 160 F.2d at 990. 
53. In an effort to distinguish the Park b Tilford decision, the district court in the 
Ferraiolo case pointed out that the Park rb Tilford speculators had "to have common 
stock, which sold on the New York Stock Exchange, before they could hope to reap a 
quick profit." Ashland Oil &: Ref. Co. v. Newman, 163 F. Supp. 506, 507 (N.D. Ohio 
1957), afj'd sub nom. Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), 
54. But see Meeker &: Cooney, supra note 33, at 963. 
55. See Blau v. Max Factor &: Co., 342 F.2d 304, 308 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 86 
Sup. Ct. 180 (1965); Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 
U.S. 927 (1959). 
56. 352 F.2d at 156. 
57. Brief for Appellant, pp. 10, 15-17, Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156 (3d 
Cir. 1965). 
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securities is inconsistent with its observation that the decision "must 
tum on the basic purpose of the statute."58 
3. Motivation 
Although the courts have devoted considerable attention to the 
perplexing problem of whether anti-dilution provisions and ease of 
marketability render two securities "economic equivalents," the 
principal judicial concern has been in regard to the significance that 
should be attributed to the element of volition in conversions and 
similar transactions.59 The courts and commentators have generally 
felt that when an insider converts his securities after an unantici-
pated call for redemption of the convertible security, the transaction 
has in effect been "forced" by the corporate issuer, and therefore 
no liability should be imposed under section 16(b).60 The fullest 
development of this view appears in the Ferraiolo case, where the 
conversion was clearly precipitated by the independent action of the 
issuing corporation. The court observed that the defendant was 
merely a passive director and that he was not in fact privy to any 
inside information concerning the company.61 Thus, he could not 
have been expected to prevent or rescind the call of the convertible 
preferred. Moreover, since the market price of Ashland common 
was nine dollars above the redemption price of the convertible pre-
ferred, permitting their preferred stock to be redeemed was not. a 
realistic alternative for the shareholders. The court conceded that 
the defendant could have avoided the loss by outright sale of the 
preferred on the open market, but stated that "it can hardly be said 
that a failure to sell is tantamount to a purchase."62 
The wisdom of the court's conclusion in Ferraiolo that a forced 
conversion should not be regarded as a sale is also supported by the 
fact that when an insider is faced with an uncontrollable redemption 
call for his convertible securities at a price below the prevailing 
58. 352 F.2d at 164. 
59. See, e.g., Blau v. Lehman, 286 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1960), afj'd, 368 U.S. 403 (1962); 
Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959); 
Roberts v. Eaton, 212 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 827 (1954); Blau v. Mis-
sion Corp., 212 F.2d 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1016 (1954); Shaw v. Dreyfus, 
172 F.2d 140 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 907 (1949); Park & Tilford v. Schulte, 160 
F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947); Blau v. Lamb, 242 F. Supp. 151 
(S.D.N.Y. 1965); Blau v. Lamb, 163 F. Supp. 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Blau v. Hodgkinson, 
100 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). 
60. See, e.g., Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 
U.S. 927 (1959); Park & Tilford v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 
U.S. 761 (1947); Blau v. Lamb, 163 F. Supp. 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); 2 Loss, op. dt. supra 
note 4, at 1068; Note,. 72 HARV. L .. REv. 1392 (1959). But see the counterargument in 
Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156, 165 (3d Cir. 1965); Note, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 
719, 724 (1959). 
61. See 259 F.2d at 344. 
62. Id. at 346. 
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market value of the underlying stock, conversion may be the only 
alternative that does not represent a substantial detriment to him. 
One example of this would be a situation in which an insider who 
has received notice of a redemption call desires to maintain his 
equity interest in the issuer. Obviously, the only two means by 
which he could achieve his objective would be either to convert to 
the underlying common stock (the course adopted by the defendant 
in Ferraiolo) or to sell his convertible securities and then purchase 
an equivalent amount of the company's stock in the market. It 
should be noted, however, that the latter method may involve a 
substantial risk of incurring liability under the act in a falling 
market. In this respect, although section 16(b) is not concerned with 
profits obtained from transactions in two independent classes of 
securities issued by the same corporation, 63 it is arguable that any 
two issues of securities, such as convertibles and the underlying 
common, which are so related as to afford a means of achieving in-
and-out trading profits, are included within the scope of the act.64 
On the basis of this reasoning, if an insider sells his convertible 
securities to avoid the redemption and then repurchases the under-
lying security within six months at a lower market price, he would 
be subject to liability, since the statute encompasses profits from 
"sales and purchases" as well as "purchases and sales."65 Thus, if an 
insider were content with his investment in the issuer, it would be 
unrealistic to expect him to sell his convertible securities with a 
view toward immediately reacquiring a proportionate interest in 
the conversion security. 
Tax considerations offer a second basis for concluding that it 
would be inequitable to require insiders, in order to avoid liability 
under section 16(b), to sell convertible securities which have been 
called for redemption. In this regard, it is evident that a forced sale 
at a profit would necessitate payment of capital gains taxes00 in the 
year the redemption call is issued, thus depriving an insider of the 
opportunity to incur tax liability at the time most convenient for 
him. Indeed, the foregoing considerations are so compelling that in 
the Ferraiolo case the owners of more than ninety-nine per cent of 
the Ashland preferred elected to convert.67 Finally, from the stand-
point of the issuer's own interests, holding that a truly forced con-
version is subject to the provisions of section 16(b) might result in 
63. Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 237 n.13 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 820 
U.S. 751 (1943). 
64. See 2 Loss, op. cit. supra note 4, at 1059; Rubin & Feldman, supra note 2, at 
486. 
65. 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964). 
66. A subsidiary argument made by the defendant in Heli-Coil was that since con-
version is not a taxable event, it should not be considered a "sale." Brief for Appel-
lant, p. 6, Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965). 
67. See 259 F.2d at 345. 
January 1966J Convertible Securities and Section 16(b) 487 
drying up a potential source of capital. If every conversion involved 
both a purchase of the underlying common stock and a sale of the 
convertible security, no insider could ever buy convertibles in the 
market without assuming the risk that a forced conversion within, 
the ensuing six months would render him liable for any profit 
realized. 68 
When the insider acts on his own volition, however, none of 
these consequences are forced upon- him, and the courts have been 
much more inclined to impose liability under section 16(b). For 
instance, the defendants in the Park b Tilford case had argued that 
since they converted in response to a redemption call, their act was 
involuntary and could not have been motivated by privileged infor-
mation. The court responded that any notion of a "forced" conver-
sion was somewhat absurd in light pf the fact that the defendants' 
control of the issuing corporation was so pervasive that they could 
have prevented the passage of the redemption resolution.69 Judge 
Clark pointed out that the Schulte group had made a routine busi-
ness decision as to the most profitable of the three possible courses 
of action-redemption, conversion and sale of the underlying com-
mon stock, or outright sale of the convertible preferred70-but did 
not offer any explanation as to how such conduct contravened the 
objectives of the statute. 
This somewhat mechanical approach to voluntary transactions 
was also evidenced in Blau v. Hodgkinson.71 The court concluded 
that the receipt of stock in a parent corporation in exchange for 
stock in a subsidiary pursuant to a plan of reorganization constituted 
a "purchase" where the defendant insider had an option to receive 
cash instead. The opinion clearly indicates that the exchange would 
not have been subject to section 16(b) if the defendant had been 
irrevocably bound to accept the parent corporation stock.72 The 
broad implications of Park b Tilford are even more apparent in 
Blau v. Lamb,78 in which the plaintiff attempted to match a con-
version with a prior purchase of preferred stock. Although the judge 
denied motions by both parties for summary judgment, he stated: 
"I do not think that the defendants have established as a matter 
of law that the conversi<;>n of their preferred into common was not 
a sale. The fact remains that the conversion of the preferred was 
voluntary and that the common which was acquired through the 
conversion was publicly held."74 In similar fashion, Judge Medina, 
68. See 2 Loss, op. cit. supra note 4, at 1068. 
69. 160 F.2d at 988. 
70. Ibid. 
71. 100 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). 
72. Id. at 373. 
73. 163 F. Supp. 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). 
74. Id. at 533. In the subsequent trial of the issues, it was held that the conversion 
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·writing the opinion in a recent Second Circuit case, concluded that 
where an exchange of stock is "in all respects voluntary," the situ-
ation could lend itself to insider manipulation and to the making 
of short-swing profits within the meaning of the statute.711 Again, 
no discussion was offered to explain the manner in which unfair 
profits could be made in the context of this particular conversion 
transaction. 
Although the foregoing decisions largely fail to illuminate their 
ratio decidendi, it is apparent that their accumulated impact is 
substantial. Thus, when the district court in the Heli-Coil case em-
phasized the voluntary nature of the transaction76 and minimized 
the defendant's argument that the securities in question were "eco-
nomic equivalents," the decision was buttressed by considerable 
authority. 
Neverthelessi a voluntary exchange of securities does not auto-
matically lead to liability. In Roberts v. Eaton77 the defendant in-
sider, who owned 45.9 per cent of the outstanding common stock 
of Old Town Corporation, requested and obtained stockholder ap-
proval to convert all of the corporation's stock into a more market-
able form. The newly created securities were subsequently sold 
within six months of the exchange. It was held that the combined 
effect of full disclosure of the proposed reclassification, equal treat-
ment of all stockholders,78 and maintenance of defendant's propor-
tionate interest immediately after the transaction precluded the 
possibility of unfair use of confidential information. The clear im-
plication of the Eaton decision is that even in voluntary exchanges 
the insider may be permitted to rid himself of liability, provided 
he can marshal sufficient evidence negating any inference that the 
transaction is an integral step in a scheme to exploit inside knowl-
edge79 or to stimulate market activity. so 
of preferred stock into common was a "sale." Blau v. Lamb, 242 F. Supp. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 
1965). In this decision, the court emphasized the fact that the transaction was com-
pletely voluntary. Id. at 157. 
75. Blau v. Lehman, 286 F.2d 786, 792 (2d Cir. 1960), aff'd without consideration 
of this point, 368 U.S. 403 (1962). Accord, B. T. Babbitt, Inc. v. Lachner, 332 F.2d 255, 
258 (2d Cir. 1964) (dictum). 
76. See Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 222 F. Supp. 831, 835 (D.N.J. 1963). On appeal, 
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit regarded the lack of compulsion in the 
transaction as an element of "some importance," but the court preferred to rest its 
decision on a "rule of thumb." 352 F.2d 156, 167 (3d Cir. 1965). 
77. 212 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 827 (1954). 
78. Nonpreferential treatment was also considered to be an important factor in 
the Ferraiolo case. See Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342, 346 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. 
denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959). But see Note, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 719, 723 (1959). 
79. Cf. Blau v. Max Factor &: Co., 342 F.2d 304, 308 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 86 
Sup. Ct. 180 (1965). 
80. Unusual market activities by insiders are regarded in the investment commu-
nity as indications of management's appraisal of the corporation's future prospects and 
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In summary, it appears that although the courts purport to be 
strictly enforcing section 16(b) in all exchanges of stock, in practice 
some courts have adopted a rebuttable presumption of liability 
whenever the conversion is truly voluntary. Although the defen-
dant's burden of proof is onerous, it is nevertheless possible to pre-
vent "harsh and wooden results quite unnecessary to achieve the 
purposes of the act."81 However, it is evident from a comparison 
of the results in Park & Tilford and Heli-Coil with those in Eaton 
that to be persuasive, the exculpatory evidence must go to the pecu-
liar circumstances of the transaction-such as full disclosure and 
stockholder approval82-rather than a general theory of "economic 
equivalence." Indeed, it must be conclusively demonstrated that 
neither the other owners of the convertible securities nor the hold-
ers of the common stock have been injured by the conversion.83 
D. Objective Measure of Proof 
The language of section 16(b) clearly indicates that Congress 
intended to permit recovery after short-swing transactions even 
though an insider may have initially acquired his securities for long-
term investment purposes, but was subsequently forced to sell be-
cause of changed circumstances.84 The need for this objective mea-
sure of proof was graphically illustrated by Thomas Corcoran, chief 
spokesman for the proponents of the act, when he stated: 
You hold the director, irrespective of any intention or expec-
-tation to sell the security within 6 months after, because it will 
be absolutely impossible to prove the existence of such inten-
tion or expectation, and you have to have this crude rule of 
thumb, because you cannot undertake the burden of having 
can precipitate violent fluctuations in the price of the stock. See Meeker 8e Cooney, 
supra note 33, at 978; C9mment, 69 YALE L.J. 868 (1960). 
81. See Blau v. Mission Corp., 212 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1016 
(1954). 
82. It should be noted, however, that stockholder approval alone will not over-
come the presumption of unfairness associated with a conversion and quick sale 
of the underlying security. Cf. Magida v. Continental Can Co., 231 F.2d 843 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 351 U.S. 972 (1956); Perlman v. Timberlake, 172 F. Supp. 246 (S.D.N.Y. 
1959). 
83. See Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 
927 (1959); Roberts v. Eaton, 212 F.2d 82, 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 827 
(1954); cf. Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172 F.2d 140, 142 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 907 
QM~ , 
84. "[A]ny profit realized by him [the insider] from any purchase and sale, or any 
sale and purchase, of any equity security of •.. [the] issuer (other than an exempted 
security) within any period of less than six months, unless such security was acquired 
in good faith in connection with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be 
recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial 
owner, director, or officer in entering into such transaction of holding the security 
purchased or of not repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding six months." 
48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964). 
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to prove that the director intended, at the time he bought, to 
get out on a short swing. 85 
Although the "crude rule of thumb" was instituted for the limited 
function of obviating the need to prove actual use of inside infor-
mation, its purpose seems to have been misconstrued by the Third 
Circuit in Heli-Coil. Indeed, the court felt that this inflexible rule 
foreclosed all inquiry into facts indicating that it would have been 
impossible for Webster to exploit inside knowledge.80 The confusion 
seems to stem from an assumption that the "rule of thumb" urged 
by Mr. Corcoran and the "possibility of abuse" test adopted by the 
courts are mutually exclusive concepts. However, the statutory his-
tory of the act makes it clear that the function of the "rule of 
thumb'.' is merely to eliminate the prohibitory burden of establish-
ing an insider's intent. The "possibility of abuse" test, on the other 
hand, is related to the broader objective of determining whether 
a particular transaction even permits the unfair use of inside infor-
mation. It seems apparent that the remedial purpose of the act 
would not be jeopardized by applying these concepts concur-
rently.87 Moreover, it is manifest that the mechanical approach of 
holding an apparently innocuous conversion to be a purchase or 
sale is largely a judicial technique to lengthen the six-month limi-
tation period set forth in the statute. Thus, since the procedure of 
converting preferred or debentures and then selling the underlying 
security is merely an alternative method of disposing of the con-
vertible security, the rule adopted in Heli-Coil had the effect of 
penalizing the insider for doing indirectly what it was conceded he 
could have done directly over the eight-month period which had 
elapsed.88 
II. THE Goon-FAITH DEBT EXCEPTION 
A second aspect of section 16(b) that has received much less 
attention than the elusive definitions of "purchase" and "sale" is 
the·express exception for good-faith debts. Notwithstanding the fact 
that profits have been realized from short-swing transactions, the 
insider may still escape liability if the securities in question were 
85. Hearings on S. Res. 81, and S. Res, 56 6- 97, supra note 2, at 6557. 
86. See 352 F.2d at 164-65. 
87. It should be noted that in addition to lacking support in the statute, the use 
of the "rule of thumb" theory in Heli-Coil is also contrary to the expressions in other 
recent conversion cases. For instance, Judge Medina recently stated that "while we 
held the transaction not to be a 'purchase' in Roberts v. Eaton, ••• the same line 
of reasoning was used. What was done in that case did not lend itself to the further• 
ancc of the prohibited purpose. There is no rule of thumb; nor would it be wise to 
attempt to formulate such a rule.'' Blau v. Lehman, 286 F.2d 786, 792 (2d Cir. 1960), 
affd, 368 U.S. 403 (1962). Accord, Blau v. Max Factor&: Co,, 342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 86 Sup. Ct. 180 (1965). But see 2 Loss, op. cit. supra note 4 (Supp. 1962, 
at 33). 
88. Cf. Blau v. Max Factor&: Co., supra note 87, at 808-09. 
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acquired in good faith in connection with an antecedent debt.89 
Whether the profits from a particular purchase and. sale qualify for 
the exemption is essentially a question of the bona fides of the trans-
action.90 Thus, whereas the over-all design of section 16(b) is based 
upon a strict objective measure of proof which proscribes all inquiry 
into the intent underlying an insider's conduct,91 the good-faith 
debt exception expressly incorporates a subjective standard which 
permits an examination into the reason for accepting securities in 
discharge of a debt.92 For many years it was felt that this good-faith 
test required a showing that it was absolutely necessary to take the 
securities in payment.93 However, in a recent decision it was pointed 
out that it would be unreasonable to interpret the statute as confin-
ing the exemption to unusual situations where there is a com-
plete lack of choice on the part of the creditor.94 Instead, the element 
of choice should simply be recognized as one of the factors to be 
weighed in determining the insider's good faith.95 
A. Situations in Which the Exception Is Applicable 
The debt exception constituted a minor point of construction in 
• the early case of Smolowe v. Delendo Corp.,96 where one defendant 
insider acquired company stock which he used within a six-month 
period to repay a debt owing to a second insider. Although the 
phrase "acquired ... in connection with" seems to be broad enough 
to encompass the payment of debts by delivering stock, the court 
felt that the adoption of such an interpretation would defeat the 
purpose of the exception, since profits otherwise recoverable under 
the statute could be washed out by the simple expedient of borrow-
ing money which could be repaid in appreciated stock.97 The court 
therefore refused to apply the good-faith debt exception on behalf 
of the first ( debtor) insider, but, on the other hand, did hold that 
the stock received by the second insider in satisfaction of a bona 
fide debt could be disposed of at any time without liability.98 It is 
89. 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964). 
90. See Rheem Mfg. Co. v. Rheem, 295 F.2d 473, 476 (9th Cir. 1961); Rubin 8e 
Feldman, Statutory Inhibitions Upon Unfair U~e of Corporate Information by In-
siders, 95 U. PA. L. REv. 468, 487 (1947). 
91. See text accompanying notes 84 and 85 supra. · 
92. Rheem Mfg. Co. v. Rheem, 295 F.2d 473 (9th Cir. 1961). See Note, 1962 DuKE 
L.J. 589, 593; Note, 23 U. Pm. L. REv. 1020, 1021 (1962). 
. 93. See Perlman v. Timberlake, 172 F. Supp. 246, 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (dictum); 
Cook 8e Feldman, Insider Trading Under the Securities Exchange Act, 66 HARv. L. 
REv. 612, 632-33 (1953); Rubin 8e Feldman, supra note 90, at 487. 
94. See Rheem Mfg. Co. v. Rheem, 295 F.2d 473, 477 (9th Cir. 1961). 
95. Ibid. 
96: 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943). 
97. See id. at 239. 
98. Ibid. 
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obvious that a contrary interpretation would deprive the lender in 
such a situation of the full benefit of repayment. 
The only other decision which has applied the debt exception 
is Rheem Manufacturing Co. v. Rheem/19 where the clause received 
its most thorough consideration to date. Pursuant to the issuer's 
retirement plan, which provided a choice among insurance, annu-
ities, cash, and company stock, defendant Rheem elected to receive 
his benefits in the form of stock. For accounting purposes, the com-
pany issued Rheem a check for the amount of his interest in the 
plan, and he in tum gave his personal check for the number of 
shares nearest in value to this interest. Shortly thereafter, he pledged 
the shares with a bank to secure a prior debt. Just before the ex-
piration of the six-month period following these transactions, the 
pledgee bank began selling the shares through a broker in order to 
liquidate the indebtedness. The court held that Rheem was not 
liable for the profits realized from these sales, since his employer 
had an unconditional obligation to pay a fixed sum quite apart from 
the form of the settlement by the stock transfer.100 
B. The Conversion Cases 
In contrast to the foregoing decisions, insiders in conversion 
cases have never succeeded in convincing the courts that a conversion 
security was received in connection with an antecedent debt. In the 
context of Park rb Tilford, this result is easily justified. Neither pre-
ferred stock nor a conversion clause in such stock in any way consti-
tutes a debt obligation. Instead, the preferred merely represents an 
interest in the equity and profits of the issuer, and the convertible 
feature grants the holder an option to select one form of ownership 
in lieu of another.101 
The rationale of Park rb Tilford, however, does not necessarily 
preclude application of the debt exception to convertible bonds, 
which are, in fact, debt obligations of the issuing corporation. In 
the Heli-Coil case, for example, the indenture agreement specifically 
stated that the bonds constituted an unconditional promise on the 
part of the issuing corporation to pay a definite sum of money, plus 
annual interest of five per cent.102 Thus, when the bonds were con-
verted and the underlying common stock acquired, the issuer's debt 
obligation to the defendant was extinguished. 
99. 295 F.2d 473 (9th Cir. 1961). The case is discussed in Note, 1962 DUKE L.J. 589; 
23 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1020 (1962). 
100. 295 F.2d at 476. 
IOI. See Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984, 987 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
332 U.S. 761 (1947). The exception is obviously limited to securities acquired in pay• 
ment of an actual debt. See Blau v. Ogsbury, CCH Fm. SEC. L. REP. 1J 90635 (S,D,N.Y. 
1953), afj'd, 210 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1954) (no consideration given to the good-faith debt 
exception 011- appeal); Kogan v. Schulte, 61 F. Supp. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1945). 
102. 352 F.2d at 158. 
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Although it might appear that the good-faith debt exception 
should therefore be applicable to this situation, there are several 
reasons for not allowing insiders holding convertible bonds to make 
use of it. In the first place, it is somewhat misleading to characterize 
a convertible bond as representing only a debt obligation. In fact, 
a convertible bond is a composite of two distinct elements: a debt 
obligation and a speculative option permitting the holder to share 
in any market appreciation which may result from enhanced earn-
ings prospects.103 Thus, convertible bonds cannot meet the test an-
nounced in Rheem, which requires the existence of an obligation 
prior to and apart from the settlement that occurs when the stock 
is transferred.104 As the court noted in the Heli-Coil case, a contrary 
interpretation would permit widespread abuse of section 16(b), since 
nearly all acquisitions of stock can take the form of a contract in 
which the seller owes a debt in the form of an obligation to deliver 
the stock at some future time, and in which the buyer has a corre-
sponding obligation to pay for the stock in money or other prop-
erty.105 Moreover, a determination that convertible bonds are not 
to be treated as ordinary debts also appears to be consistent with the 
over-all design of the Securities Exchange Act, since the statutory 
definition of equity securities explicitly includes debentures which 
may be converted to common stock.106 
A final consideration which suggests that convertible bonds 
should not be permitted to come within the good-faith debt excep-
tion relates to the observation in the Rheem case that this exemption 
was merely intended to make possible the "one-shot settlement of 
matured debts."107 With convertible bonds it is quite clear that 
there is no matured debt prior to the due date specified in the inden-
ture agreement. Furthermore, the features of redemption and con-
vertibility totally preclude the generally accepted concept of a 
matured debt.108 
Ill. CONCLUSION 
The all-encompassing interpretations to which the broad lan-
guage of section 16(b) quite naturally lends itself have been a source 
of disquietude since the inception of the Securities Exchange Act.109 
Nevertheless, Congress manifestly intended to deter insider abuse, 
and the courts have demonstrated a sense of responsibility in effect-
103. See generally 1 DEW'ING, FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 269 (5th ed. 1953). 
104. See Rheem Mfg. Co. v. Rheem, 295 F.2d 473, 476 (9th Cir. 1961). 
105. 352 F.2d at 169. Accord, Varian Associates v. Booth, 224 F. Supp. 225, 227 (D. 
Mass. 1963), afj'd, 334 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965). 
106. 48 Stat. 884 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(ll) (1964). 
107. 295 F.2d at 476. 
108. See Hell-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 222 F. Supp. 831, 836 (D.N.J. 1963), afl'd, 
352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965). 
109. See generally Yourd, Trading in Securities by Directors, Officers and Stock-
holders: Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act, 38 MICH. L. REv. 134 (1939). 
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ing this policy, even to the extent of consciously imposing a "crush-
ing liability" to serve as a deterrent.110 Indeed, even though the 
Securities and Exchange Commission has exercised its expert judg-
ment in certain instances and determined that various transactions 
present little possibility for abuse relative to the legitimate function 
they serve, 111 the courts have nevertheless invalidated these exemp-
tions if they provide any conceivable unfair advantage.112 This rather 
inflexible administration of an admittedly arbitrary statute118 has 
given rise to frequent and severe criticism.114 
It has recently 9een suggested, however, that the Procrustean 
approach manifested in earlier decisions is now largely a historical 
phenomenon.115 In particular, there seems to be an increasing ten-
dency to scrutinize the interrelated facts of exchange and conversion 
cases,116 which have traditionally involved the greatest conceptual 
difficulties in applying the terms "purchase" and "sale." In fact, 
prior to Heli-Coil, it appeared that the courts had completely de-
parted from the sweeping rule of liability originally advanced in 
the Smolowe case and reiterated in Park b Tilford. Although the 
Heli-Coil court was certainly correct in its thesis that the remedial 
purposes underlying section 16(b) require a strict, objective standard 
of proof, it does not follow that Congress intended the administra-
tion of the statute to be purely mechanical in every respect. Indeed, 
the weight of authority clearly indicates that the approach must be 
pragmatic, not technical,117 and it should be noted that the Heli-
Coil court did adopt a pragmatic rationale for the consideration of 
the good-faith debt exception. It is to be hoped that the courts will 
continue to be attentive to an insider's demonstration of functional 
reasons why a particular voluntary transaction did not permit any 
possibility for ahpse. As the dissent in Heli-Coil pointed out, the 
110. See Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 52 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 
(1951). 
111. Section 16(b) contains an exemption provision which states that: "This sub-
section shall not be construed to cover • • • any transaction or transactions which the 
commission by rules and regulations may exempt as not comprehended within the 
purpose of this subsection." 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964). 
112. See Greene v. Dietz, 247 F.2d 689 (2d Cir. 1957); Colby v. Klune, 178 F.2d 872 
(2d Cir. 1949); Perlman v. Timberlake, 172 F. Supp. 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). 
113. See notes 84 and 85 supra and accompanying text. 
114. See, e.g., 2 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1087-90 (2d ed. 1961); Halleran &: 
Calderwood, Effect of Federal Regulation on Distribution of and Trading in Securi-
ties, 28 GEO. WASH, L. REv. 86, 114 (1959). 
115. See Painter, The Evolving Role of Section 16(b), 62 MICH. L. REv. 649, 678 
(1964). 
116. See Blau v. Max Factor &: Co., 342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 86 Sup. Ct. 
180 (1965); Booth v. Varian Associates, 334 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 
961 (1965); '.Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 
927 (1959); Blau v. Lamb, 242 F. Supp. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). 
117. See Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342, 344 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 859 
U.S. 927 (1959); .Painter, supra note 115, at 661. . 
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choice is between the majority's "rule of thumb" and "a rule of 
reason designed to achieve a result that is both just and respectful 
of the legislative language and intendment."118 
W. Richard Keller 
118. 352 F.2d at 173-74. 
